struggles between an ~agrarian bourgeoisie," on the one hand, and those who believed in ~a cooperative principle that challenged the tenets of bourgeois individualism and property, that challenged the hegemony of the marketplace," on the other. 2 'This was not simply a clash between people or classes with different economic interests, Hahn believes, but a full-blown culturaVideological struggle: What underlay contention over the material consequences of the stock law were considerably different, and increasingly antagonistic, ideas about social relations and property rights. The freedom to which [stock-law opponents] adhered was not merely that founded upon ownership of one's person and exchange in the marketplace, but that founded upon control over productive resources, labor time, and subsistence which, in tum, could be realized only through membership in the commonwealth of producers. The stock-law controversy set the republicanism of those producers against the values of the free market.' To its critics, according to Hahn, the stock law ~was the starkest instance of efforts by the emerging postbellwn elite to cast petty producers into a state of dependency." Central to Hahn's larger interpretation of the transfonnation of the nineteenth-century upcountry, the fence-law contests, in his words, "paved the road to Populism.,. Actually devoting little direct attention to Populism itself, Hahn concentrates on two small counties in the Georgia hills, Carroll and Jackson.
In this article, we revisit the battles that Hahn addresses, evaluating his and others' hypotheses about fence-law conflicts within the two counties in his study. In addition to reexamining the published debate between proponents and opponents of this livestock-enclosure movement, we explicitly and rigorously test Hahn's and others' explanations by formulating competing models and assessing them with multivariate statistical methods. We fmd more subtlety and Complexity in the debate and the clashes of interest than they appear to have in Hahn's presentation. While we do not doubt that differences over policy stances and ideology often move people to action, we do believe that the importance of such factors must be weighed against the evidence in each particular case, rather than automatically assumed to be determinative. ' In this instance, we show that it is possible to divides the cotmties of Alabama and Mississippi into those that had either partially or completely adopted the stock law by 1890 and those in which the open range persisted. Using 1880 census data, he then compares several of the objective traits of the two groups of COWlties: population density, racial proportions, fann-tenure arrangements and size, intensity of cultivation and concentration on cotton, and nwnber of livestock (especially hogs) per person. Failing to employ any multivariate methods or explicit statistical models, King presents only a series of contrasts between the mean values of each variable in the two sets of coWlties. Although he concludes that his results "suggest a much more complex interpretation than the simplistic and somewhat artificial picture of battle between 'haves' and 'have-nots' ,"King does not flesh out such an interpretation himself. 12 Historians are not the only scholars to notice fence laws. In a now classic 1960 paper, the economist Ronald H. Coase employs the example of a dispute bel\yeen a fanner and a cattle raiser over who should compensate the other for the damage caused by livestock in the absence of a fence between their adjacent properties.ll In certain circumstances, Coase argues, the individuals would voiWltarily come to an agreement that would maximize the value of what the two of them produced, regardless of who initially owned the grazing rights. A cooperative Coasian solution might not take place, however, if there were too many potential partie!! to the agreement. More bargainers would multiply the difficulty of gaining information about each individual's true preferences and behavior and therefore complicate the negotiation and enforcement of any contract.
•• The same difficulties that would Wldermine a free-market solution would have a similar effect on a voiWltary conununitarian arrangement, Wlless every person in the conununity were altruistic, since non-altruists would have strong incentives to take advantage of their fellows' generosity. 15 This probable contractual breakdown can be particularly disastrous in what natural resource economists refer to as "corrunon pool" situations. 16 If flshennen do not consider the effect of their current actions on the welfare of others or themselves in the future, they may quickly deplete the resource.
As long as the pond is overstocked, no hwnan suffers. But if the supply of fish falls below a certain point, then every fish caught by one person is a meal denied to another. If the supply declines to a point below the replacement level, every fish taken hurts not only individuals other than the one fishing, but the society as a whole. Similarly, under the fence law, the owners of grazing animals could let them nm free on other peoples' land. This law therefore encouraged stock raisers to increase the size of their herds beyond the size they would have maintained if they had to confine and feed the animals on their own property. Conversely, landowners in such a situation would tend to underinvest in improvements other than fences, lawyers' fees, and buckshot. 17 Where there is plenty of forest or scrub land, free grazing may damage society less than the cost of enclosing the animals. But as the supply of forests, nuts, and grasses decreases, more and more fanners-renters and sharecroppers, as well as landowners-will suffer losses from roaming animals; and future generations will be robbed to allow for the rapid exploitation of resources in the present. Since every fanner under an open-range regime has an economic incen-. tive to transfer his own cost of raising livestock onto others, private contracts in this setting are difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate and enforce when there are many fanners. Such a situation inevitably creates a demand for government intervention; but because the strength of the competing groups varies, the government's ultimate decision is likely to be influenced by the power of each individual group." The ftnal allocation of property rights dictated by the government, therefore, may not confonn to the one that maximizes "social welfare" and offers no guarantee that the outcome would be equitable to any person or group.
According to Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, people will seek a change in the institutional status quo when the net present value of a new regime of property rights exceeds the net present value of the traditional set of rights.
19 As the costs and benefits are continuously changing under each 17 S1ock -law admcal<s often chargrd that I he slalus quo kd lo loo many law•niu. Sec. e.g., Canolhon (Ga.) Carroll County TimtJ, january 10, 1873; Carrolhon (Ga.) Carroll Frtt Pms, Ma)' 8 ami June 5. 1885;Jcrfcrson (Ga.)joc!son lftrold, Apri115, 1881, Augu51 24. 1883, ami Angus! 2. 1885. 10 Sec for example Geo rge J. Sligler. "The Theory of Economic Rcgnlalion," Btll institutional structure, the net present value calculation will become a dynamic process that individuals and groups constantly update. Examples of changes that might have encouraged groups in upcountry Georgia to reassess the costs and benefits of keeping the fence law include technological advances in agriculture and animal husbandry, improved transportation, changes in population density, increases in cultivated acreage, and changes in the relative prices of certain commodities, such as timber, labor, animals, animal products, and agricultural produce.
While the inhabitants of the nineteenth-century Georgia upcountry were unaware of neoclassical economic theory, many of their argwnents in the fence-law debate resemble those of modem economists. Like recent theorists of property rights and institutional change, nineteenth-century Georgians discussed prospective gains in farming efficiency and resource conservation. There was widespread agreement that the decision turned on the availability of timber for fenceS, the density of population, and the degrees of concentration on growing crops and raising stock. Since, unlike economists, the practical disputants were seeking to form majority coalitions in referenda, there was also considerable discussion of who might be expected to gain or lose if the institutional structure changed. By far the most common abstract or ideological appeal during the debate stressed the inconsistency of the fence law with private property rights-an indication that stock-law proponents believed that the citizens of the upcountry shared a belief in the moral correctness of private property rights. By contrast, invocations of traditional rights, which Hahn equates with "preindustrial republicanism," were a quite minor part of extant records of the debate over fence laws in Carroll and Jackson Counties; even those who refetted to such rights treated them as exceptional and temporary constraints on a more general system of private property. 211 Rather than an ideological conflict over abstract principles, the debate was largely a hard-headed clash of interests waged by pragmatic agriculturalists. "We know," said stock-law supporterS. B. Orr of Carroll County, "that people will vote for what they suppose to be personal interest in this matter. " 21 Georgia law from colonial times until after the Civil War essentially of institutions, ace: Gary D. Libecap, "Property Righls in Economic Hislory: lmplicaliona for Research." Ezplorolioru i11 Eco11o•i€ Hulo.,, XXIII (July 1986), 227-52. 10 Hahn, Rooll of SouiA•m Populu•. 253 . In an examinalion of much more: recent conflicll over fence: laws in Shasta Counay, California, Robert C. Ellickson emphasizes that mosl were ac:ulc:d by "norma of neighborliness," rather than by r"sorling lo lhc law. In difficult caac:a, he: notes, thc:ac informal m"lhods included rhetorical backbiting and thrcalc:nc:d or aclual violc:nc" againSI inlruding animals. Nc:vcnhdcss, his inlc:rvic:wa ahow"d an almost univc:nal belief thai "an own"r of livc:slock is r"sponsibl., for the acls of his animals.
• In other word a, 1hc:y believed in whal Hahn IUms "absolule private: propc:ny. · ·sec Ellickson, "OfCoase and Caule: Oispule R.,solution Among Nc:ighhora in Shasta Coumy," Stanford Low Rrouw, XXXVIII (february 1986), 623-87 (quolations in foolnolc: 20 arc on p. 673).
11 Carrollton Carroll Fr11 Prm, May 22, 1885. held that unfenced land could be used as common pasture. 22 This was not an English or "Celtic" inheritance, for in the densely populated British Isles, common law did not force property owners to fence in their crops. 23 Rather, owners of animals were required to keep their stock on their own property, and stray animals on a neighbor's enclosed or unenclosed land were considered trespassers. Vast unimproved land and sparse settlements in America, however, made it economical to allow animals to roam the counttyside freely. Eventually, landowners were compelled either to erect and maintain "lawful" fences or to forgo legal claims to compensation for damages caused by another person's animaJs.2A Georgia's f1rst fence law, passed in 1759, explicitly required that:
All fences or enclosures that shall be made around or about any garden, orchard, rice ground, indigo field, plantation or settlement in this province, shall be six feet high from the ground when staked or ridered and from the ground to the height of three feet of every such fence or enclosure, the rails thereof shall not be more than four inches distant from each other; and that all fences or enclosures that shall consist of paling shall likewise be six feet from the ground and the pales thereof not more than two inches asunder: Provided always, that where any fence or enclosure shall be made with a ditch or trench, the same shall be four feet wide, and in that case the fence shall be5ix feet high from the bottom of the ditch.zs
Those whose fences did not adhere precisely to the fence law were subject to treble damages if they killed or injured a stray animal on inadequately fenced land. 26 In the 1881 decisioo of Hamilton v. Howard, the Georgia Supreme Court declared that a lawful fence had to rise five feet from the n Even under the fence-law regime, •common rights" were not unlimited. Although people were free to allow their animalato roam the countryaidc, they did not, accordin11 to the Georaia Supreme Court, have a lawful "common tide" to uncncloacd land. In Wnghl H. HorTillv. HannuM ond CollMan (56 Ga. 508 ( 1876J),the court ruled that a callle farmer did not have a riahtto paaturc in the wooda or upon the unenclosed land of others. The caulc farmer, aaid the court, "doca not act forth any contract, preouiption or other lawful basia for the riaht he claima. What belongs to the world at larae !. no man'a in n Uahn, Roots of Southtm Populu ... , 60-61 . In the urly nineteenth century, however, the Gcoraia General Assembly did reduce the leaal height of fences by a foot . Ibid. " It ia unclear how widespread "lawful" fences were, for ccnsua figures do not distinauiah between lawful and ohort or rickety fence•. One Georgia obtcrver dcdarcd that ·a lawful fence io of rare occurrence in the older countiea. • See C. W. llowanl in Carrollton Carroll Coun11 Tim11, January 10, 1873. ground everywhere, rather than merely averaging that heightY Furthermore, an 1889 decision ruled that an agreement to dispense with a partition fence (one between two neighbors) was not the equivalent of a legal fence. Unless an actual fence-not merely a contract or agreement to dispense with a fence or an agreement to treat a dividing line as a fence-were broken, it was illegal for a farmer to harm a stray. 21 The court's message throughout was clear: a legal fence was defined absolutely with no room for variations.
In the post-Civil War era, as population expanded throughout the South, as blacks took advantage of their freedom to move, and as the growth of the railroad network facilitated marketing crops from previously isolated areas, population density increased in the Georgia upcountry. Carroll County's population growth was especially rapid: the black population surged 77 percent during the 1870s and 67 percent during the 1880s; the white population also increased relatively quickly, with a total gain of76 percent over the two decades. Jackson County's black population multiplied at a more modest rate, with an 1870 to 1890 total of 45 percent, but the white sector shot up 84 percent over the two decades. Overall, Carroll County's population grew by 89 percent from 1870 to 1890; and Jackson's, by 72 percent.
29
To stock-law supporters, the increasing pressure on the land required that it be used more efticiently. 30 Almost all nineteenth-century southern farmers used "worm" fences to enclose their crops and fences made of pales for their gardens and homesteads. Because worm fences were constructed by laying the ends of rails on top of each other, zigzag fashion, a three-and-a-half to four-foot strip of land on each side of the fence was wasted. 31 For every mile of fence, approximately one acre of productive land was squandered. Writing from the adjacent county of Coweta, which had already adopted the stock law, 1. P. Reese (alias "Ripples") contended that "the old fence rows of Carroll county will make com enough in three years to pay for all the crops that will grow in the county for the next ten years." 32 Other savings could be made because improving small patches of fertile land would be profitable if they did not have to be protected by The consensus among both stock-law and fence-law supporters that the choice between the two laws depended on the demographic, ecological, and economic conditions of the locale demonsttates that this was not primarily a cultural controversy. As T. D. Henderson, the state agriculture corrunissioner, noted, "It is not expected that the stock law will be adopted in the wire-grass counties of the state, where the larger area is in pasture." In most of the counties of north Georgia, however, "the adoption of the stock law is only a question oftime," he believed.
36 Likewise, at the 1878 meeting of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, a stock-law opponent from Clay CoWtty conceded, "In Middle and Upper Georgia, I have no doubt it [the stock law) would operate well; but it would not do in Southern Georgia. No further south than Decatur county there are thousands of acres good for stock, and unless the stock run at large these lands do no good. " 37 In an 1883 editorial, the Jefferson (Ga.) Jackson Herald declared, "It stands to reason, that in an agricultural country stock is not of such great importance as the "Since the area of a square piece orland increases by the square of each side, and that of other shapes grows by sin1ilar amounts, owners of small plou had to split proportionately many more rails than owners of larger farms, if, indeed, either fenced in his land. A simple example shows the consequences in wasted land. Suppose a piece of land were square and 100 feet on each side. Then the total area would be 100 X 100 = 10,000 oquare feet. The amount occupied by a worm fence would be 100 X 7 X 4 = 2,800 square feet (i.e., length times width times number of sides). (We used the sm>ller estimate of width to minimize the figure for w:osted land.) But at each corner, thc fences would overlap, so we must eliminate 7 X 7 X 4 = 196 square feet (width times width times number of corners). So the fence would take up2,604 square feet, or 26 percent, of the land. If the square were 1,000 feet long, a similar calculation shows that . the percentage occupied by the fence would amount to only about 2.8 percent oft he larger field . (If all fenceo were on the edges of every farmer's land, so that only half of the widd1 of each fence would have to he subtracted from the land of each farmer, the calculations would lead to analogous percentages of 13.5 and 1.4.) This admittedly extreme example demonstrates two principles: first, it could ~ relatively waoteful to fence small fertile portions of fidds; second, where fences were maintained, the burden of the fence law fell disproportionally on small, not large, farmers.
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crops, hence they should be confined. If this was a stock country the crops, which would be small and insignificant, ought to be fenced. " 31 Although he disagreed with the newspaper about which arrangement was to be preferred, a fence-law advocate from the Fair Play district of Jackson County accepted the notion that the decision on whether to adopt the stock law depended on "denseness or sparseness of population, the geographical situation, irrigation .... "
39
On this issue, each side's proponents in Carroll and Jackson Counties clashed less on principles than on facts. Thus, "School Boy" of Carroll County admitted that "when our fathers fust settled this connty [sic] and our range was good and when the acreage in cultivation was [s] mall, the present system of fencing was proper, but now we have no range, cows are hungry and often in our or our neighbors fields, the acreage of cleared land is more than that for pastures."
40 A week later, "Con," a fence-law supporter, asserted that "There is at least three-fourths of our land in the range or conunons . we have a splendid range of grass. Wouldn't it be foolishness to shut our stock from it? Of course it would." Although Pitts believed that Cattoll's natural resources were large enough to make the stock law unnecessary, he did not categorically dismiss the idea that fences would one day be necessary: "While they [trees) are all cut down and washed away in a great many places, Carroll boasts of plenty of timber, one thousand acres or more in one body, while the fields are small.lt 's the other way in those counties [that have adopted the stock law], and when Carroll gets in that condition we'll give up for no fence, and not before." 47 Refonners in Jackson and Carroll Counties claimed that the stock law would save farmers both labor and capital. "It takes away most of the profit of fanning to keep up good fences," announced I. H. P. Beck, a landless fanner, schoolteacher, and later local leader in the Farmers' Alliance and the Populist and Republican parties.•• "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson County, estimated that "it takes one-tenth of the time spent on the farm to repair fences. Could not we spend it more profitably? Could we not use that time in making compost heaps?" 49 "Plow Boy" suggested that "we should dispense with fences ... because we could spend our time at something that would be much more remunerative than patching up fences such as making our manure heaps larger, stopping washes, etc., besides we would have no other stock to see after but our own."" Likewise, Eugene Adair asserted that "while we used to split and haul rails, we could, under this arrangement [the stock law], with the same labor, be making manure to improve the land intended to be cultivated." 51 Farmers cared more about compost heaps than capitalism. " Carrollton C.ITOII Fr" l'rm, June 5, 188!1. For l.ovvorn'a lonallme Republican activiam, ace ibid., March 1!1, 189!1. Accordinato the 1880 cenaua manuacripta, the value ofLovvorn'alivealock waa higher than that of any other participant in the fence-law debate in the two count lea who could be traced to the cenaua. Philo H. Chandler, who awitched aides durinsthe 1880a and became a atock·law aupporter, valued hia livea1ock at the aamc amoum aa Lovvorn did. Lovvorn owned acvcnty·fivc acrea of foreat land and fifty·nine tilled acrca, and his livestock wu worth nearly four times 1ha1 of the averaae owner· operated Carroll County farm .
'' Carrollton Con'oll Coun17 Other stock -law advocates tried to make more precise calculations of the economic disadvantages of the status quo. "lbe whole subject," the Jefferson Jackson Herald ann01mced, "is one that can be reduced to dollars and cents. " 52 For instance, "School Boy" claimed that "the fences of Carroll county are worth three times more than all the hogs, cows and sheep in the county, and I ... ask ... if it is economy for a man to have one dollar invested in a business and it takes three t[o] keep that one dollar up." 53 A correspondent from Villa Rica in CaiT'OII County contended that "the land taken up by the fence around a man's farm will produce more than the value of the stock fenced out." 54 After diligent computation, "Vande Linctum" found that "for every dollar invested in livestock in the State, two dollars are required for the construction of fences to protect the growing crops."'' "Hopeful" from Human's Store, Jackson County, "found out that it costs us twice as much to fence out stock as it does to pay our taxes, and besides we have had about enough of our crops destroyed by stock to pay our taxes . ... "
56 Adair of Jackson County computed an initial cost of$210 for the materials and labor needed to fence one hundred acres." One of the few stock-law opponents to counter this argwnent, Abner Nixon, who tilled nearly twice as many acres as the average owner-operator in Carroll County and whose farm was worth nearly twice the county average, admitted that fencing stock would save timber but preferred, instead, more In the June 26 leuer, Nhwn also responded to the contention that the depredations of wandering stock unfairly reduced the value of farmers' land by arguing that the price of land had always taken into account the fact that stock could run free: "The citizens of this county have and always have had tl.-legal, mo ral, and the Bible right to let their stock, unl•ss of a dangerous character, run at large . Wf: all know (•ic(this when we purchased our lands. Even more often than they stressed saving labor and capital, refonners prophesied that the stock law would improve the quality of livestock and, thus, yield better meat and dairy products." While fencing in stock might reduce the quantity of livestock. the improved quality of the animals would more than compensate for the loss in nwnber. The argwnent by "Ripples" was typical:
The milk and butter is free from poisons taken from cows that are kept up [i.t., fenced in) and then you know what your cattle eat. But when they woods it, you don't know when you are drinking or eating deadly poisons. Butter made from cows kept up is much richer than from those cows that are allowed to run at large. There is as much difference as between gold and nickle silver. The beef is fatter, tenderer and better. Breed stock can be improved. One good cow well fed and pastured Is worth S tlcky woods cows. Two hogs kept up is worth ten razor backs running at large. Others asserted that Coweta CoWtty, which passed the stock law in 1881, was self-sufficient in meat while Canoll was not. "Here are two coWlties, one self sustaining and the other not," "Plow Boy" wrote in 1885 in the Carrollton (Oa.) Carroll Free Press, "and yet some will tell you that you cant raise hogs in a stock law county." "Ripples,~ who lived in Coweta but often wrote for the Carroll CoWlty newspapers, admitted that "we don't have quite so many hogs over here in Coweta as we used to have" before Coweta passed a stock law, but he assured residents of Carroll CoWtty that Coweta hogs "are a heap bigger and fatter. "60 The response by "L. F. L.," that "Grandpa and grandma milked ticky cows and they lived a heap better than we do," was ahnost self-mocking.
61
Unlike their grandparents, upcoWltry residents of the late nineteenth centwy increasingly enjoyed easy access to national and international markets. What James C. Bormer concluded about Canoll County characterized the whole upcountry: "The railroads did more to quicken the economic tempo of Canoll CoWlty than any other event during [ Not only did the railroad allow fanners and stock raisers to market their products more cheaply and efficiently, it also helped to increase production itself by enabling upcountJy fanners to import large amounts of commercial fertilizer. 63 Increased productivity and profitability in tum stimulated the land market, which raised the stakes of the fence-law controversy. Like railroad promoters, fence-law reformers focused on future economic gains. In a Darwinian allusion, "Edgar" declared that "we must learn to give way to the fittest, for by so doing we will keep prospering, and if not, we will never prosper.tt64 Even more certain of the stock law's necessity, Jackson County's "P." stated, "I regard it [the stock law] as the preliminary step to the prosperity of the agriculturalists of JacksQn county."" On the eve of the first fence election in Carroll County, "Ripples" chided his opponents: "Dont say the time is not yet come to begin to economize. "66 Opponents were guilty of "old fogyism, general ignorance and backwardness" for favoring a system in force "in no civilized portion of the world. "'
7
"Economy is what the Southern fanner has not learned yet. "61 Stock-law champions would teach him.
While advocates of the new regime stressed progress, their opponents just as superficially invoked tradition. Thus, Jackson County's "Fair Play" forthrightly sought to preserve the status quo: "Our present system of fencing is an old one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an innovation upon it.-Another saw the fence law as an embodiment of "the liberty that our forefathers fought for." 10 "0. W. C." of Carroll County expressed a different attitude toward risk than his stock-law neighbors: "He [1. H. P. Beck] says that he would rather jwnp into something new than to stand still and die in stagnation. There's where we differ, I would rather stagnate than to die in the stock law." Such statements made easy targets for New South metoric: "'By long usage our people are accustomed to the wagons, and why should we now try to supplant them by an engine? 1867 to 2,4591n 1880 (a 59 percent incrcuc) and to 4,600.8 in 1890 (a further 87 percent incrcaoe What the stock-law advocates wished to conserve was not the rhetorical ideals opportunistically employed by both sides in the controversy, but tangible resow-ces. They thought that unchecked exploitation of forests to build extensive networks of fences robbed futw-e generations and threatened to denude the areas of timber. As J. 0. R. Word insisted, "this is a question of vast importance not only to the present, but to the future generation," and a few weeks later he declared, "I speak in behalf of saving the timber for the benefit of the future generation .... ""Vande Linctwn" claimed that "the repair of fences annually calls for the destruction of nt'.arly 100,000 acres of timber, which, when taken in connection with other depletions of forest in the next half century, will leave the entire country destitute of timber." Moreover, since milroads not only used wood for ties but also made it possible to sell timber in a larger marketplace, the expansion of the rail network made lumber more valuable than it b.ul been when the upcountry was isolated and self-sufficient. As "Ripples" remarked, "If I owned the timber of Carroll county I would not· want any bigger fortune. The way to save your timber is adopt the stock law."
12
Although the Georgia General Assembly of 1 879 allowed barbed wire to be classed as a legal fence for the purpose of keeping out larger draft animals, the wire was relatively expensive, and refonners believed, no doubt correctly, that upcountry fanners wpuld continue to build more wooden fences for some time. 13 To concrete arguments for efficiency, prosperity, and conservation, stock-law advocateS sometimes added more philosophical appeals. remarked S. B. Orr of Carroll CoWJty. 74 "I am compelled to build a lawful fence: or in other words a fence, 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight,' to protect my own growing crop," said "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson County. "Is that just? If this land belongs to me, has your stock any right to anything that grows upon it without my consent? That is my property. As a matter of justice, as a matter of policy, what right have you to the grasses that grow on the land of your neighbor? It is only a permissive right, there is no legal or moral right in it. "n "Where does one man have a right to let his stock nm over, and feed upon another's land?'' asked "L.," a landless citiun of Carroll CoWJty in 1878. 76 Future Populist district conunitteeman I. H. P. Beck proclaimed," A man's land is his own and one man's cow has no right to nm on another's land inclosed [sic] or not."n Drawing on familiar Jeffersonian rhetoric, reformers attacked fence laws as incompatible with republican independence. As "L." advised, "If you have stock. own a piece of land to put tJ:lem on, and keep them; not have them, and allow them to nm over other's property."
71 Not only did stocklaw advocates claim that roving stock illegally violated their personal property rights, they also believed that their neighbors had a moral obligation to respect these rights. Appealing to the individualistic tradition of natwal rights, J. 0. R. Word proclaimed that "from a sense of justice between man and man, I think that every man should be compelled to take care of his own stock. that he has no moral right to tum loose his stock to prowl around upon his neighbor's ctop."
79 Illustrating the incongruity of common grazing rights within a more general system of private property, proponents of the stock law posed homespWl analogies: "A man has as much rig~t to take his household and kitchen furniture and put it in another man's house and kitchen, as he does for his stock to nm on his neighbor's enclosed or Wlenclosed [land). " 10 A Carrollton Carroll Free Press reporter from Villa Rica described the logical implication of a law that allowed an individual's stock to grau upon a neighbor's land: "If he has this right, then by the same reasoning, he would be entitled to all the property not sheltered. A buggy or wagon left from WJder the shelter would be public property. Significantly, opponents and proponents of the stock law agreed on the desirability of protecting private property, but they disagreed on the best way to do so. Private property seemed commonsensical to rnen of the nineteenth-century upcoWltry. Thus, fence-law supporter "Fair Play" of Jackson CoWlty declared that "viewing the question from a strictly legal standpoint, it would seem to be just to enact some law whereby every one should be protected in the full use and enjoyment of whatever property rightfully belonged to him; as for instance it would appear meet and proper that the owner of lands should have the same right to restrain others from grazing stock on his premises as he would to prevent them from felling his timber. "
12 Although Hahn leaves out the part of the letter by "Fair Play" just quoted, he does quote the succeeding lines: "Our present system is an old one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an innovation upon il From long usage our people have become accustomed toil, and any change in or abridgment of it will unquestionably work serious injury to a large number of our citizens." Far from reflecting a competing moral system or "expression of natural right," as Hahn contends, the whole statement by "Fair Play" accepts private property as moral but bemoans its consequence for those who would be losers if the open range were closed. This is hardly tantamount to endorsing a "cooperative commonwealth" but rather represents a standard politieal appeal that has been used by the Right as well as the Left from time out of mind. 13 Agreement on the principle of private property left fence-law advocates open to charges of inconsistency: "Why is it," asked "Vande Linctum" of Jackson County, "that if I climb over my neighbor's fence, four and a half feet high, and cut, trample, break down, or in any manner injure or destroy his wheat, com, cotton or other crops, that the law punishes me, yet my stock may cross the very same fence and commit the same depredations and the law protects them?"'"' While Hahn admits that fence-law supporters believed in some private property rights, he contends that only stock-law advocates accepted what he tenns "absolute property" and that private property and free-grazing rights did not appear contradictory in nineteenthcentury upcountry society. But as the statement by "Fair Play" demonstrates, the fme distinction is Hahn's, not that of the debaters of the 1880s, and the contradiction was as evident to at least some nineteenth-century eyes as to those of the twentieth century." Although other fence-law supporters a ftt simple 10 land. h~ is ~nlitl~d to allth~ fruits and benefits of it. including pasturage. His n~ighbors hav~ no right to pastur~ their stock upon it. . . . If all your neighborsshouhl fenc~ in a/lthdr lands, your stock would b~ confin~d to your own land for support; hut you could not complain. for it is fully admiued th~y ha•·~ the right to enclose every acre they own . ignored the contradiction between the principle of private property and the practice of unimpeded grazing, their silence provides no evidence that they uplicitly questioned that principle, which Halm 's larger argument requires. Rather, free grazing was for them merely a convenient exception to the regime of private property. Since the decision on whether or not to enforce strict property rights would be made by voters in collective referenda rather than by individual bargainers in a market, a good deal of the debate consisted of appeals for support and attempts to shape coalitions. Although they did not use the phrase, stock-law proponents Wlderstood the concept of a Pareto improvement (a change that makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off), and they freely admitted that their reform would not help everyone. "School Boy, .. for example, stated, "I will admit that there are a few men that it [the stock law) will not suit-though I think it will benefit twenty-five where it will injure one." In similar fashion, J. 0. R. Word reasoned, "Admitting the no fence Jaw would work a hardship against a few, would it not be the part of wisdom to legislate for the best good of many[?)" "Submuloc" of Jackson County agreed: .. We need not hope to please everybody, for that is impossible. Our object should be to promote the general good, and our motto 'Pro Bono Publico. ' " 16 In a system of majority rule, the proposed Jaw did not need to benefit everyone to be adopted.
Some historians have asserted that the fence debate split the society into two neat groups. Flynn arrayed laborers and tenants of both races along with "very small fanners, the poorer end of the landowning class" on one side and richer white landowners on the other. 17 Halm saw the combatants as "the mass of Upcounlry yeomen, tenants, and laborers" against "landlords, merchants, and business interests. "a This is not, however, the only possible division. If voters cast their ballots for the stock or fence law so as to maximize their expected incomes, if the market for labor was competitive, and if transaction costs were so high that private agreements were not a viable solution, then the lineup of socioeconomic groups ought to have been more complex than Flynn and Halm claim. F'Jtst. consider landowners. If the stock law passed and a landowner expected lobe a net loser, he or she would experience the full effect of the loss, all other things being equal. Clearly, as Flynn and Hahn argue, -Conlro4 1861-19" (Bacon Rouse and London, 1991), xi-xvi. Since there were dearly ~any hLy:'n and aellen oflabor in the market, olnce (uthc population increaoe ligurco Cited ea:·;1er ahow) labor wao very mobile, and oince the: 1880o were rc:latively proopcrous yeara fo" oouthern [armcn, those who doubt that the labor market in the upcountry was compet!iiv~ bear a htavyburdcn of proof. Contemporarico recognilrd thio. As a stock-law IUpporter. Ill Coweta County, who waa tryins to convince tenants and rarm laborcn to ~upport h11 •ide, put it in 1881: "Never wao(1hrre)auch demand [or work ohll kinds as
In thea d
• a C e aya. Newnan HmJid,June :'10, 1881. Moreover, stock-law aupporten concc:drol , t 1 ;rroll County's "SchoolBoy" affirmed: "We all know thotth(i)s black population vole horde nee and they are to prejudiced that whenrver the (otock] law is carried over thrir Cea 1 • they will at once leave without waitinsto ace whrther its(Jic] a good or bad law ."
arrollton CoiToll Coun11 Tiwtts, September I, 1882.
yeomen fanners who relied on the open range to feed their animals should have been solidly against any redefmition of property rights. 110 Wealthy stock raisers, whom they do not mention, should also have opposed any change.
9 t Conversely, owners of land suitable for pasture but not as appropriate for growing crops should have expected to profit from the stock law and, consequently, should have been well disposed toward reform.
If landowners could be expected to divide over the issue and tenants and laborers to support the fence law overwhebningly, as Hahn and Flynn contend, then stock-law supporters should have had no chance of success in these two counties. Table I shows the occupations of black and white household heads in Carroll and Jackson Counties. Tenants and laborers of both races made up substantial proportions of the voting populations in both counties, respectively 43.9 and 46.9 of the white and 91.7 and 93.1 of the black household heads. In addition, 72.4 percent and 57.6 percent of the white fann owners in Carroll and Jackson Counties, respectively, operated farms with less than fifty acres of tilled land. In swn, yeomen, tenants, and laborers were the overwhelming majority of the electorate in both counties, and if they acted as these historians say they did, there should have been no contest over the fence law.
But tenants cannot so easily be placed in the fence-law camp on the basis of fll'St principles as Hahn and FlyM assert.
92 hnagine a landowner and a 00 Explicit calculations of the amount of money that each landowner and tenant in the two counties could have expected lo gain or lose from the stoclr.law In 1880 show that 52 percent of the "winnins" landowners tilled fewer than forty acres and 40 percent of the "losins"landownen tilled more than forty acres. By this measure of malerialsclf-interesl, not every small farmer should have opposed the stock law and not every large farmer should heve favored il. Sec below for a fuller explanation of the "savings" measure. 91 According to a Mr. Carmichael, "We have been eaten up by bigcouon planters' stock and their lenanla, and the widows and orphans of our county and our immediate neighborhood have had to abandon their little farms sinct the war, on account of these big men and their big herds of stock.
• Procwli"g> of the Georgia State llcrlcultural Socirty, 1876 to 1878, pp. 414-15. Ellickson found in Shasta Count)', California, that the impetus for a move to close the range came from the depredations of the animals belonging to a large cal!le rais<r and that, while many small properly holders favored a stock law, the major caule owners favored continuation of the open range. "OfCoase and Caule," 647-!>3.
" We use the term "tenant" generically. For our purposes it is not important to distinguish among cash renters, shue tenants, or sharecroppers, because all three might or might not own animals and all might be able lo bargain for pasture rights. By "tenant" we mean to imply that the farmer did not own his or her land and therefore signed a contract with a landowner specifying, for example,lhe rent (in -kind or cash), the level of landowner supervioion, and the amoulll of forell and pasture provided by the owner, among other things. See leeJ. tenant signing a contract stipulating that the landowner would furnish no pasture and therefore the tenant had to provide for his or her animals elsewhere. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C. M. Wood, a landlord from Hannony Grove, Jackson County, for example, the subject of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was stated also that "there is to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation. 0093 lf the rental contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage and provided no pasture or unimproved land on which animals could forage, tenants then had four options: they could pen their animals and feed them purchased grain or fodder grown on their own small farms, send animals out into the forest to find food, rent pasture, or keep no animals.~~t Whether a tenant signed such an agreement or received pasture as part of the contract, the net income that each of these tenants expected to receive should have been roughly equal, holding everything else constant, if the market for labor was competitive across the region. Simple economic reasoning shows that wxler a fence-Jaw regime, any landlord in a competitive labor market would have to offer a tenant a contract of the same total value, substituting other incentives for pasiure, if he or she did not offer pasture. Otherwise, the landlord would attnct fewer tenants or less competent ones.
05 Similar reasoning suggests that if the stock Jaw were adopted, competition for tenants should have compelled the landowner to compensate any tenant whose animals had previously been dependent on the open range by giving him or her pasture, taking a smaller share of the crop, or reducing the cash rent. As a group, therefore, tenants should have been indifferent between the stock and fence laws. A similar argwnent can be made with respect to the before and after wages of farm laborers. 14 1n Carroll County 714 of 910 tenant fanners (78 percent) reported no pasture or unimproved land, and in Jackson County 144 of3H tenants (42 percent) were in the same situation, according to our 100 percent sample of the 1880 Agricultural Manuscript Schedules of the U. S. Census. Thiscensus, of course, predated the adoption oCt he stock law anywhere in either county.
"'In the 1880 census, 5 percent of the tenants and 18 percent of the farm owners in Carroll County reported having pasture. In Jackson County, the proportions wore 15 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Ninety·sevento 98pcrcent of the landowners in the two counties reported having pasture, forest, or unimproved land on their )>laces, compued to 22 percent of the Carroll County tenants and (iO percent of those in Jackson County. Nearly evcry landowner in both counties reported o•ming at least one non-draft animal, as did 89 percent of the tenants in Jackson County and 96 percent in Carroll County. Three conclusions may !,., drawn . First , especi;olly in Carroll County, large numbers of tenants must have loosed their animals on the land of I heir landlords or on that of neighbors; for lhese people, the imposition of the stock law posed atleastohortterm difficuhies. Second, nearly all landowners load somc a•·ailaLie unimproved land where if water was available, stock could be pastured. Third, even before the stock law, some farmers-a third oft he owners inJackson County-did fence in their animals, despite the lack of a law requiring i1 ; for them, the stock law was a pu re benefit.
'"Since holdings of animals were II. ted only in the agricuhural schedule of the U.S .
Contemporaries understood the logic of market competition well. Jackson County's "Progress" asserted that the stock law would make both landowners and their tenants better off. "The income of tenants and wages of hirelings will be regulated by the profits of the land owners .... Renters now demand houses for their families, and why not demand, under the new law, pasturage for their stock with the same propriety? This they will do, and receive it at far less cost to the owner than is required to repair fences." Similarly, the Jefferson Jackson Herald editorialized: "It is pure fallacy to say that the laborer or tenant, or, as the demagogues have it, the poor man, will suffer by it. The man who will have the burden to bear will be the man who owns the land. He will be compelled to furnish pasturage for his tenants or not get them, and it is impossible for him to do without help." ''Tenant" believed that "whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly get the best tenants, as it is all bosh about the land-holder being more independent than the tenant, for what is his land worth to him without labor?" In Rockdale County, which was one of the first to pass the stock law, the editor of the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who can arrange the best pastures to secure the best tenants. "91 This analysis is supported, rather than undermined, by the constant assertions from the fence-law side that the stock law would damage tenants.
The reason that they showed unusual concern for the poor, even for the black poor, while they made less direct appeals to cattle raisers and farmers who lived in sparsely settled areas, we suggest, is that the interests of the latter two groups were much more obvious than those of tenants. Tenants received so much attention in the debate because they were the swing voters. The same logic, moreover, suggests that there was no widespread coercion of tenants by landlords to vote one way or another in these secret ballot elections: if tenants' votes could be easily won through pressure, cenaua and aince only l:indownen and tenanll were liated in thatachedule, itla imponible to determine exactly what percentage of wage laborer• owned animals. If a laborer did own a cow or pig and if he kept the animal on the open range, he would experience a decrease in real income when the atock law waa impoaed because he would have had either to rent puture and purchase feed or to sell the animal. Alternatively, a laborer who owned no animala waa probably indifferent between the two laws, at least in the ahort run. If he expected to own atock eventually, then he might have favored the open range. (Since the average age of both white and black household heada who were wage laboren waa leu than that of cub renten and ownen in both Carroll and Jackson Countiea in 1880, laboren may have expected to move up the agricultural ladder u they aged.) However, aince improved acreage would have increased and fence• for past urea needed to be built if the atock law were enacted, the ahort-lerm demand for wage labor migh1 have increased in that cue, cauaing upward preasure on wages. Overall, in the long run, the competilive market for labor ahould have equalized the wage of laboren in s1ock-law area• with that of those in nearby opcn..,..n&e lands, leas moving coolS. 
COMMON SENSE OR COMMONWV.LTH?
why bother appealing to their intellects?
Some renters, such as future Populist I. H. P. Beck, announced, "I am going to vote for 'no fence' because I think it will be to my interest to do so and every other renter," while other debaters disagreed. 91 Thus, an anonymous writer in Catroll County declared that the stock law is ultimately going to be the ruin of the people and most especially the poor people that have no where to keep their stock. They arc entirely dependent upon the land owners for pasture for which he will charge them more than double what their milk and cow is worth .. .. There is not one man out of ten that will let them have pasture room free of rent. ... It is time now for the poor people to open their eyes and to come forward and stand up for their rights and ilot allow themselves to be led by the cliMing land owners any longer and to come out and say that we want a fence and tum out en masse and cany the election for a fence .... A. or C. two or three dollars a month to keep your cow in his pasture, and pay your rent."" 10 Lindsay J. Jones of Snake's Creek, who as·a member of the Democratic county executive committee in 1892 fought against the Populists, put the rhetoric most picturesquely: "I want to say to tht voters of Carroll county, that we as poor men, and negroes, do not need the [stock] law, but we need a democratic government and independence, that will do the common people good. If the rich men wants to put their stock up in pens aU right."
101 Or, as one tenant farmer bluntly observed, "This [stock] law will simply take rights away from the poor man and give them to the rich." 1 az
The material conditions of SOOle fence-law supporters lent a discordant note to their apparentiy radical appeals to lower-class interests. John Stogner owned a fann worth two thousand dollars, nearly four times that of the average fannin CanoU County in 1880. Although he reported no pennanent pasture to census officials, Stogner did possess thirteen cows and cattle, fifteen swine, and forty sheep, and he planted ten acres of cotton and twenty-five of com. During the 1880s, he had a sufficiently large herd that he drove them to Atlanta to market.
•m But to listen to his rhetoric, he was a representative of another class. He condemned the stock law as "the greatest curse upon the poor laborer that has been since the civil war. We were told in 1859 that secession was the greatest thing that the South could do, so it was to lead her into destruction. It was a rich mans war and a poor mans fight, so will the stock law be a benefit to a few landlords who have plenty of water on their lands while nine tenths of the people will be in a deplorable condition." If the stock law passed, according to Stogner, "the common laborer will be the ones that will be the sufferers ... and why should we try [to] oppress this class any worse. God makes the grass[,) the mountaines crown, and com in valleys grow, so lets not try to deprive our poor neighbors from receiving his blessing .... " Abner Nixon, whose farm was worth one thousand dollars and who valued his livestock at the not inconsiderable sum of two hundred dollars, added a historical note to predictions of the law's effect: "The stock law will divide the people of this county into classes similar to the patricians and plebians of anci·~nt Rome, which unhappy division, was the source of much contention, injustice, violence and blood shed, and ftnally the overthrow of the republic, the kingdom and the empire, and brought on the dark ages of the world. "
1M
Some stock-law supporters lent credence to the class oppression charges of their critics. Although he himself held no land, "L." contended that "the non land holding class have no right to vote on this subject. " 1 os Favoring a property qualification for every election and accusing a fence-law proponent of being pro-black, "L." thought it "sensible ... to allow the landholders to say, whether they shall fence their lands or not. . .. Well do I know, to my sorrow, that the negroes and one fourth of the whites have been allowed the privilege of going to the ballot box! That is what is the matter with the countiy today!"
106 One bizarre proposal even aimed to disfranchise landowners who had not erected fences around their land.
107
While disavowing support for black suffrage, fence-law proponents condemned these disfranchisement proposals. Philo H. Chandler, a Democratic party leader from the Kansas district of Carroll County during the 1880s and 1890s who later became a stock-law supporter, denounced "such a law to prohibit any one from voting [as] wickedness in the eye of the law, and the eye of God." Moves to disfranchise all blacks or propertyless whites, he wrote, "are tyrannical and we are opposed to them from the fact that we live in an independent government by the people. " 101 Proponents of the stock law, disturbed by the actual or potential appeal of their critics' argwnent that tenants would be hurt by abandoning free grazing, convinced the state legislature to amend state law. After 1881, in subcoWlty militia districts where the stock law was voted into effect, but not in whole coWlties, landlords were legally required to furnish tenants with sufficient pasture to acconunodate one cow and one calf, provided that the tenant shared the work of fencing.
110
. Contemporary debaters were well aware of this legal guarantee. When "Ripples" cited it before a coWltywide election, ~con" wrote in the next week, pointing out that it applied only to arrangements adopted in district referenda.
111
Thus, each side fought for the tenants' support in the usual ways of political campaigners, raising fears on the one hand and seeking to allay them on the other. Had tenants' interests been more obvious, there would not have been such a loud debate, and they would have voted tnore overwhelmingly for the fence law than they in fact did, as we show below.
Landowners, tenants, and laborers were not the only socioeconomic categories that were relevant to the fence-law controversy. Twenty-one percent of the household heads in the two coWlties in 1880 were African Americans. In the context of southern political campaigns in the 1880s, the fence-law controversy generated relatively little race-baiting. Since nearly everyone expected blacks to vote overwhelmingly against the stock law, it is surprising that there were as few charges as there were that fence-law supporters wished "to array ignorant negroes against intelligent white people."
112 Instead, those who favored the stock law often asserted that blacks, as well as many whites, did not properly Wtderstand their own interests. "The negroes," said S. B. Orr, for example, "oppose it through prejudice and ignorance. " 113 Whatever traditional yeoman conununity there was in the upcoWltry, blacks did not fit into it comfortably, and both sides quotation), 1878. Chamller com·erted lo the stock-law side by 1882. For this switch and his later Democratic party leadership, see ibid., july 7 and August 18, 1882, and june 6, 1884; and Carrollton CaiTo// Frtt Prm, July 8, 1892. 100 appealed to them largely in their economic roles as tenants and wage laborers, rather than as African Americans per se. 114 It was another sign of the economic, rather than cultural, nature of the homespun debate.
Hahn treats the residents of small towns as merely commercial interests, neglecting the fact that their gardens and noses had much to gain from controls on stray pigs and cows. 115 While to a twentieth-century suburbanite the issue may be merely symbolic, to a nineteenth-century villager it may well have been primarily olfactory. Although they made up only 13 percent of the household heads in 1880, before the completion of the major railroads that served the two counties, townspeople provided a core of support for the stock law.
116 1n 1886 Carrollton imposed the stock law by town ordinance.l 17 In the 1881 election in Jackson County, the two most "wban" of the county's eleven precincts provided 48 percent of the countywide vote in favor ofthe stock law.
To test the Flynn/Hahn two-class model against more complex alternatives, we focus on the five countywide referenda on the stock law held in Carroll County from 1881 to 1890-in January 1882, September 1882, July 1885, July 1887,and July 1890-and the two held in Jackson County in July 1881 and September 1883.
119 In addition, we use information from local option elections in many of the militia districts, which were sporadically and incompletely reported in the newspapers. We pay particular attention to changes in the voting patterns over time.
Although the fence side consistently attracted a majority of those casting ballots in both counties, there are two important trends in the data, only the fust of which has been stressed by previous historians (see Table 2 ). The fence law gradually lost support throughout the 1880s. As the time-series of turnout figures demonstrates, however, this decline was overshadowed by the dramatic decrease in participation on both sides of the issue. 120 indication of the intense competition between the fence-and stock-law factions. As the editor of the Carrollton Carroll County Times remarked after the second ballot in his county: "No election for a long time in Carroll bas excited more interest than the electiOQ last Saturday on the fence question. Exciting the interest it did, of course there was a full vote polledlarger, we believe. than any we have had in a long time."
111 By 1885 the intensity on both sides began to wane-ahnost twenty percentage points fewer eligible voters cast ballots-and the stock law gained marginally at the polls as a result of the diminished interest. By 1890 turnout in the stocklaw referendum fell to only 19 percent If Populism was, among other things, an outgrowth of the fence-law struggle, it seems counterintuitive that the temperature of the controversy cooled as the 1890s approached.
While proponents of the stock law were able to increase their relative share of the electorate over time. their base of support in Carroll County was quite WlStable. estimates of the probability that voters who supported one side in one election continued supporting that position, switched to the other side, or abstained from voting in a subsequent contest. 123 While an estimated 92 percent of the fence-law voters in Carroll's firSt election in January 1882 voted for the status quo again in September of that year, only 67 percent of the stock-law voters continued their support in September. Moreover, of those who voted for the stock law in Jaimary, 29 percent simply did not vote the second time. This is surprising, since the interval between the two elections was so short and since overall turnout rose by 17 percentage points from the firSt to the second contest. It is interesting to note that '" 1\ecauoc: some estimates calculated by ordinary least "luares fell ouuide tlae logical 0-100 percent bounds, we have estimated rhe equations undcolring tlocsc Lablcs in logit form. almost 29 percent of the nonvoters in the ftrst election supported the fence law in the second election, while about 20 percent of the newly mobilized cast their franchises for the stock-law position.
Panel B of Table 3 , which contains estimates of behavioral continuity and change in Carroll CoWity from the September 1882 election to the one in July 1885, shows an even greater pattern ofvolatility, especially on the stock-law side. Of those who voted for the new institution in September 1882, only half remained faithful through the next election, and almost half abstained. Stock-law proponents attracted 59 percent of those who had not voted in 1882; otherwise, the stock law's showing in 1885 would certainly have been even more meager. Conversely, the fence-law faction was able to maintain approximately three-fourths of its support over this period, with most of the remainder abstaining in the later election. In smn, Carroll COWity's stock-law coalition did not vote with the vigor that we would expect from a self-conscious class of "merchants, big landlords, and other commercial interests" out to impose a new economic order with themselves in social and economic control. Moreover, the interests of fence-law supporters were apparently either so obvious that they did not need an organization to succeed or, contrary to Hahn's claim, they were able to "develop an organizational apparatus to mobilize their ranks and inspire confidence in their nwnerical strength. "t,..
Panel C of Table 3 shows that Jackson CoWity's stock-law coalition was extremely cohesive between 1881 and 1883. The fence-law side retained two-thirds of its backers over the same period and gained about 28 percent of those who had abstained at ftrst Although the stock-Jaw group was able to hold its support in Jackson CoWity through 1883, the law's proponents were continuously overpowered by the nwnerical strength of the fence-law advocates. Canoll County's stock-law voters, by contrast, were too fickle and too few to prevail at the county level. tll Frustrated by their repeated coWitywide defeats, stock-law supporters began to concentrate their attention on adopting the law at the militiadistrict level. By the 1887 countywide election in Carroll, eight of the fifteen districts had adopted the stock law in district referenda. In four of these eight districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared the victor, but after being contested on the groWid of ballot fraud, the Carroll County Ordinary Qudge) overturned the results and declared the '"Hahn. Rools ofSoulhern PopuliJm, 256 (first quotation) and 267 (second quotation). Note that Carroll County stock-law supporters did not shift or drop out before 188g as a rc:sult of district dection vicaorieS, ~cause, as far as we know from the newspapers, there were no district-only stock-law referenda in the county brfore 1884.
"' "F-tests" for the "null" hypothesis that there was no statistical r<lationship between voting in each pair of elections yield values of 12.9, 6.0, and 15.0 for panels A, 8 , and C, respectively, which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the .0 I level in every instance_ "R.squares" for the log it equations in each pan<! are 0.691 for panel A, 0.512 for panel 8, and 0. 779 for panel C. All are reasonably good fits. districts stock-law areas. 126 1be precise wording of the law, no doubt, confused the voters: the county election ballots were required to read either "fence" or "no fence," the latter meaning the sloe k law. The district election ballots, however, had to be either "for fence" or for the "stock law. "Tile election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly muddled: the pte· cinct managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73; however, the actual vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for "fence," 2 for "a fence," and 2 for "the fence." 1be Carroll Cotmty Ordinary, after hearing arguments from both sides, threw out 33 votes not cast "for fence," thus leaving a majority of 3 votes for the stock law. 127 In the remaining four districts, however, the stock law won unequivocal majorities.
Thus, by taking advantage of legal changes and ambiguities and by concentrating their attention on the much smaller districts, stock-law supporters were able to close the open range of Carroll and Jackson Counties little by little. 1be election rules were designed by the legislature to allow stock-law supporters to prevail in the areas that mattered most to them, those closest to either their farms or town property . 121 Once a district was recorded as voting for the stock law, that decision could not be reversed. As more and more districts jumped the fence, the area of open range and, therefore, its value to any stock owner in fence-law territory declined.
Since more than half of Canoll County's districts were already tmder the stock-law rule by July 1887, it is not surprising that only about half of the eligible voters cast ballots in that month's countywide stock-law election. Within the next tlvee years, five more districts imposed the stock law, and turnout in the 1890 contest plwnmeted to 19 percent. The decrease was IN It iJ difikuh to conoiderSamuelj. Brown, the Carroll Coumy Ordinary in 1887, an agent of capitalism or one of the "agrarian bourgeoisie." In 1880 the only man named S.
J. Brown in the county lived in Carrollton but owned a twenty-acre farm worth $500, of which he tilled thirteen acreo. He apparently kept his one horse, one cow, one other head of canle, and aeven pigs in a one-acre paature; or perhaps to prevent overgrazing on hio own land, he allowed aome of them to run at large. According to our meaaure of proopective gaino and loasea ifthe atoddaw were adopted, which we explain below, Brown would hne gained the amalloum of$40.74 ifthe stock law had been adopted in 1880.In the 1894 tax recorda, he ioliated u owning fifty acrea valued at $200 in the Bowdon dlatrict but no town or paper aaaeu. His total wealth waa reported to be $325. By comparison, the average wealth of the thirty.four members of the Populiot county executive comminee in that yearwaa $6!5, and that of the fifty-three memberaohhe Democratic county executive comminee wu $1,754. See Kantor, "Property Righta," 280. Even allowing for a pouible undentatement of his reoourceo, it doeo not aeem that Brown was a rich man.
117 Carrollton C.rroll Fr11 Prm, March 18 and 25, 1887.
Ill The aucceu of plan ten and townspeople in convincing the lcgiolature to change the rule a on 11ock-law voting In 1881 contram dramatically with the apparent inability of the largeot capitalistlnterell in the otate, the railroads, to craft the llock-law rules in their favor. Since animals who wandered onto the tracks olowed traino and caused lawsuits, railroada, which by the 1880s otretched throughout the llate, had a conoiderable otake in lmpooing the otock law llalewide. If capitalistic interests increasingly dominated the otate'a politico, as Hahn lmplieo, one would expect that railroado would have had more influence in the llock-law controveny than they did. NoTE: • These arc lhc orl&lnal returns, some of which were lhrown oul by lhc Carroll County Ordinary. Some dislrlcls voted more lhan once.
most dramatic in the stock-law districts. 129 Table 4 shows Carroll County's voter turnout and election results for three types of districts: those that adopted the stock law by the 1887 countywide election, those that adopted after the 1887 election but before the 1890 contest, and finally, those districts that did not adopt the law until after 1890. The table tracks voter activity from 1882 to 1890, including district referenda, where the returns were available. What is apparent from Panel A of Table 4 is that once districts adopted the stock law, many voters apparently felt that the costs of casting a ballot for either option were too high to justify a trip to the polls.no
The fiJ'St group of districts sent 75 percent of their eligible voters to the polls in September 1882. In the 1885 countywide and district referenda and in later elections after these districts adopted the stock law, turnout declined, falling to 41.6 percent in 1887 and to a low of 12.9 percent in 1890. The second set of districts followed the same general pattern, with turnout in excess of 60 percent in January and September 1882, 1885, 1887, and in their district elections but only 23.8 percent in the 1890 countywide ballot. In regions where the open range continued to be argued actively, however, voters continued to go to the polls in large nwnbers. Of the voters who lived in districts that retained the open range through the 1890 election, 55.8 percent went to the polls in the last countywide election, and 72.3 percent in referenda in their own districts-in striking contrast to the 12.9 and 23.8 percent turnout in the districts that had already adopted the stock law for themselves. And as Panel B of Table 4 shows, the open-range districts voted faithfully for the fence law in county referenda throughout the election process.
Tables 3 and 4 mar Hahn's image of helpless partisans of common rights overwhelmed by a juggernaut of merchants and rich farmers who represented the impersonal free market. 131 Fence-law partisans won all seven countywide elections in the two counties from 1881 to 1890; and their pattern of support was, on the whole, much less volatile than that of their opponents. Even more serious for Hahn's thesis, after gaining the adoption of their preferred arrangement in their own districts, most stock-law supporters abstained in subsequent countywide referenda, rather than seeking to impose their views on open-range areas. nus is not a conclusion that depends on even the very simple statistical analysis of election returns presented in Table 4 , for contemporaries repeatedly commented on the issue. For instance, the pro-stock law Carrollton Carroil Free Press agreed with a correspondent who thought it "wrong for the county to pass on the question as to whether they should have the stock law in his district as the policy has been heretofore to let the districts act upon this matter for themselves." 1be proper policy, the editor wrote, was to "let each district work out its own salvation, but don't force it on a district whether they are willing or not. " 132 Another correspondent, from a district that voted in favor of imposing the stock law on itself in May 1890 but against requiring it for the whole county little more than a month later, declared, "We got it by district election and we did not believe it was right to force it on those districts who did not have a majority to get themselves."
133
On the same day in 1890 that Carroll County stock-law supporters abstained in droves, the same voters decided another issue in a local "' llahn, Roots of Southern PopuliJm, 262 and 267. ,. Carrollton Carroll Frtt Prm,Junr 27, 1890. "'Ibid., july 18, 1890. referendum. Bitterly contested for years, the proposal to issue bonds to erect a new county cowthouse attracted 1,432 ballots in districts that had adopted the stock law. But strikingly, only 650 of the same voters who had already assumed the cost of going to the polls in the two-issue election bothered to express their opinions on the coWltywide fence question. In those districts where the stock law was not yet in force, however, there were 204 ballots on the bond question and 210 on the stock law . 134 This special "allegiance to local control" displayed in the 1890 election is a clear indication that fence refonners were not engaged in any sweeping plan to restructure the social or cultural basis of their economy. 135 Their goal, instead, was to restructure property rights in specific local geographic areas where economic efficiencies could be captured through a redefmition of the tort liability regarding animals and fences.
If the analysis of changes in the overall vote totals partially alters the nature of the conflict as depicted by previous historians, it does not uncover the socioeconomic coalitions on each side, and it casts only a limited light on voters' motives. Did men vote for the fence law in order to voice their objections to the encroaching capitalist market and preserve a traditional comnumity of rough equals, as Hahn contends? Did the fence-law conflict, as both Aynn and Halm assert, divide this agricultural society into two distinct classes? Or, do the voting patterns suggest a more complex pattern of divisions, as our economic self-interest model implies?
The rich data available allows us to address these questions in more than one way. Let us first consider the order in which the militia districts in Carroll County adopted the stock law. If the self-interest thesis is correct, then those districts in which farmers should have expected to gain the most from the imposition of the stock law should have adopted it fust, while those in which more farmers benefited monetarily from the fence law should have dragged their collective feet. Using our I 00 percent sample of the 1880 agricultural census manuscript returns, we have constructed a measure of the extent of the savings or losses for each district in the two coWlties if the stock law had been put into force instantaneously in that year. 136 We then calculated Spearman's Rho, a rank-order correlation '"Ibid., july 4, 1890. As their correspondent "Martin" ofSmithlidd noted after the 1890 declion, "We got it (the llock law( by district election and we did not believe it was right to force it on those districts who did not have a majority to get themselves. So our motto was fence and no bonds."/bid,July 18, 1890.
"'Quotation from Bonner, Gtorgio'J LiJJI Fronlur, 143. '"To approximate the txpectrd savings or loss, we estimated the amount of land wasted by fence rows within <ach diSirict and calculated the value of crops that could ha>·e been grown on that land, less the cost or growing them. Next, we assigned livestock to available pasturage that existed before the institutional change and estimated a fcr.d allowance for those animals that were pr<viously unenclosed and that would now have to be put behind fences. We subtracted the value of this feed from the net profit of the aforementioned crops. Sine~ farmers would need to tnaintain fewer ft-nccs under che closed-range policy, we calculated the approximate coSI of replacing broken fences nary overturned the initially announced results, the cmelation is 0.79, which is significant at the 1 percent level. While these results do not prove that the self-interest model is cmect, they clearly lend support to it.
We also petfonned an ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis using county referendum returns as dependent variables and socioeconomic variables as independent variables. u 7 Because theoretical notions (ours among them) are often rather vague and because it is rarely obvious just how to operationaliz.e a ~ we estimated equations with several different combinations of variables. TableS delineates the variables that we think give the most accurate and fair test of the various hypotheses offered by Hahn, flynn, King, and ourselves; Ill To determine the support · '" The fact, pointed out earlier, that the numbt:r of balloll In tht: courthouet: referendum wueo much taraer than th•tln the llock.Jaw rderendum In C.rroll Counly
In 1890 juellf~ea ourdt:cbion lo cetimate the reare~~iOn equation• siven In T•ble Sin three lt:parate equation•, rather than by • lW<Htase procedure. On tht: fence queation in Carroll County, it b obYiouethat men did not lint decide whether or not to vote on 1he fence·law queetlon, and then whkh way to vole. lnt~ead, the 1wo dcclalona were made •lmulllneoualy. We aleo eetimated eimilar cquatlona with losit modeta. Since the reauhs paralleled thoae ueina ordinary leut aquare1 regre11lon, we diKUII the aimpler models.
TeeiS to dctennine whether it waa appropriate to conaolida1e all the elecliona in bo1h countlee were alao performed. When included in equalionelike thoae in TableS, dummy variableethattre~ted the countiee •nd elec1iona aeparatcly chanse the reaulll in only one r~epect: in the non-pooled equa1lona, the coefficienJS on 1he 14borm variable arc never ••snificant. Thle doee not change our overall inlerprelalion ala II. We did not add mililiadistrict to countyWide-referendum returna bccauae, as we have arsucd at length in I he text, very different conaiderationa moved 1he voten In 1he two 1ype1 or clectlona.
111 Nearly all the different specification• or 1he model aupported the inlerprelllion advanced in the text. For inat.ance, in Table 6 , eubsli1u1ins 1he perccntaae of farm• le~antcd in each dinrict for the percent.aae of tenaniS a mona houet:hold head• changee ~enher a eign of any coeffiCient nor the identiliee of the variablu that are natinically
••gnilicant at the conventional .OS level. Funhermore, eupplantins the percentage reeiding in town• with the value of town real e11a1e per capha or 1he pcrccnt.age of fore a I for the fence-and stock-law positions among all potential voters in the seven cmmtywide referenda in the two coWlties, we divided the number of votes for each side in each militia district by the estimated number of polls in each district. 139 Although the definitions of most of the independent variables are selfevident, the rationale for each needs explanation. Two or perhaps three variables tap somewhat different facets of self-interest among farmers. The more Wlirnproved forest land each district had, the more wood was available for fences, and the more room animals had to roam without intruding on crop land or garden plots. Consequently, the district's voters should have been less enthusiastic. about the stock law than in more developed areas. Similarly, the higher the proportion of farmers who, according to our calculations, should have expected to save money as a result of the passage of the stock law and the lower the proportion of farmers who should have expected to lose money, the greater should have been support for the change.
. A third variable, the value of white-owned farm real estate from the tax digest divided by the number of white male voters in each district, partly indexes self-interest and partly indicates class conflict. 140 Those who owned either land convenient to railroad stations and markets or notably , fertile land, which was most suitable for growing crops and therefore most vulnerable to the depredations of animals, had the largest material interest in overthrowing the fence iaw. Conversely, those who lived in districts where the fannland was less valuable, and therefore relatively more suitable for livestock and less fit for crops, had a good deal to lose from the land wilh the percentage of Jilled land does not change any signs or significance: levels. Only sets of independent variable• I hat are highly interrc:laled give appreciably different resuhs than those in Table 6 . Because it is always d ifficult to inlerpret the paramelen of slrongly collinear independent variables, we em1>loy a set of variablc:a that captured different facets of each explanation. It is, of course, possible that we err in our opcrationalizalion of hypotheses. If so, our explicit and exact formul3tion of them may stimulate productive debate if others propose and test alternative empirical models. As has been widely noted, two of the chief vinues of quantitative socialscientilic history are the clarity that it forces and ita tendency to channel debate towards questions ami techniques thai allow definitive answen. 111 We adjusted the number ofpoUs reported in the county taxdigeus upward for each district because a comparison of data from the tax rolls with the 1880 manuscript census ntnnben of males over 21 in each county indicated that the tax assessors, who were supposed to assess even the propertyless, missed about 45 percelll of the black and 23 percent of the white male household heads in Carroll County aud 30 percent of the: black and 19!>c:rcent of the: white male household heads in jackson County. Since the published 1890 census does not give the number of males over 21 by minor civil division and the manuscripts for that census burned, we were forced to usc the tax digest number of polls for each district for each election year, and we had to inOale every dislrict's number of polls by the percentages for the whole county, given above. 110 Because, as Table I above shows, only about5 percent of black household heads in the two count ies owned farms (and their farms probably had disproportionately low values). we: excluded blacks from the numentor and denominator of this statistic.
stock law, at least in the short tenn. Nonetheless, beca~ this variable also scales fanners and townspeople into the relatively rich and the relatively poor. it is also an indication of class conflict and fits into part of the hypotheses of Bonner, Flynn, and Hahn. We have therefore assigned it a position in Tables Sand 6 Wlder the "class-conflict thesis."
Four variables express other aspects of the Hahn and/or Flynn models.
Both authors hold that tenants and laborers should have feared the specter of social control that the stock law raised, as well as the material loss of free pasturage for their cows and pigs. Hahn believes that the "democratic commonwealth of producers" was strongest where wealth was most evenly distributed: "The districts lending the stock law its substantial support tended to have the closest links to market centers, the highest real-estate assessments and per capita wealth, and the greatest concentrations of land held by large landowners. It was here that merchants, big landlords, and other conunercial interests wielded most influence and authority. Poorer, rural districts having more evenly distributed landholdings, on the other hand, rejected the law overwhelmingly and at times almost Wlahimously.
Here small fanners feeling the new strains of staple agriculture had their fumest cultural foothold. " 141 Although Hahn offers no systematic evidence for this proposition, we tested it by calculating a Oini index of inequality of landholdings among owner-operators in each districl 142 The higher the index, the more skewed the distribution and, according to Hahn, the greater should have been the support for the stock law. Finally, if the fence-law controversy was a "central feature" of an "increasingly withering attack" by elites on "common rights," as Hahn contends, then one should expect the attempt to foster social control not only to persist but, if anything, also to gain impetus aftera district-level victory. 143 To capture this idea, we created a "dununy" variable, that is, a variable that takes on the values of only zero and one. Calling this variable stkinfrc (for "stock law in force"), we set it at one for districts that had already adopted the stock law by the time of the relevant COWlty referendwn and at zero otherwise. If Hahn is correct, the denizens of stock-law districts should have tried to force their practices on others.
The last variable, the percentage of household heads in each district living within town limits, stands for different notions for Bonner and Hahn than it does for us. 1be earlier historians saw the towns as outposts of capitalism or progress and change, and as opponents of traditional practices. While we largely agree with that description, we stress that townspeople, having less forest or common land and fewer animals than '"llahn, Rools of Soulhtrn Populism, 243. rural Georgians, stood to lose little by the closing of the range and that they probably viewed other people's animals as nuisances. According to either hypothesis, town-<lominated districts should have opposed the fence law. If Hahn is conect and the bourgeois were aggressively trying to expand the sphere of market rel;aliuns, then they should have continued to do so even after their own districts accepted the stock law. The choice between the two interpretations of townsmen's behavior, then, lies not in the patterns of relationships of the town variable, but in those of stkinfrc. Hahn observes but does not sufficiently emphasize, "simple economic interest played a large role" in fence-law conflicts.t 45 If the value of fann real estate per voter is considered an indication of class conflict, then it implies that those in richer areas were more likely to participate in stock-law elections, all other things being equal, and were somewhat more likely to vote for the stock law than for the fence law. The data suggests that there was a palpable division between the white land-rich and the white land-poor over the fence law.
Yet a simple two-class conflict model poorly fits the data from Carroll and Jackson Comities because group interests did not divide neatly into two parts. As our analysis of the competitive market for labor implied, tenants and laborers seem to have been largely indifferent between the fence and stock laws. In fact, the coefficients for the relationships between the percentages of tenants and laborers and voting on the issue have the opposite signs to those that the fence-law proponents' rhetoric suggested, and the coefficient for the laborers was statistically significant at the conventipnal S percent level. Instead of turning out solidly for the fence law or the stock law, tenants and laborers appear to have abstained from voting. 146 The regressioo results strongly diseonfum Hahn's cultural-alllftict model. AU other things being equal, the greater the equality of landholdings in a district, the stronger, not the wral:er, the support for the stock law, and the coefficient is statistically signilicant.
141 That is, controlling for other fac-
•• Becauac African Americana In theae two countica were overwhelminsly but not entirely farm laboren, enterins the perc en lase or blacka in each disuictocparately inlo the equation lcada to problems of muhicollinearity. Since blacka were addreued in lht debale larsely in their economic, rather than racial rolea, we chose lo uoc the laborer rather lluon lhe black variable; but an equation aubalitulingthe black percentage (or the farm laborer percenlase produce• very aimilar reauhs. It is conceivable that black• were coerced to atay away from the polls, but there was no mention of this occurrins In rither coun1y. Since the Carrolhon CarToll F111 PriJJ did discuu charge• lhat Cowela Coun1y blacks had been encouraaed lo so lo a alate fair by alack-law auppotlen who feared thai blacka would vote Cor the fence-law aide, it ocem• likely lhat any auch event, In Carroll County at leaat, would have been noticed in the newapapcr. See Carrolhon CaJTotl Frtt Prm,July 16 and 25, 1886.
1 " If the coellkient of varia lion (that ia, the slandard devialion divided by tl•e mean) tors, areas peopled by relatively undifferentiated yeomen, the sorts of places where, according to Hahn, "preindustrial republicanism" thrived, were especially likely to favor fencing in animals. 141 And, as the simpler analysis of the voting already presented showed, those who lived in areas where the stock law had been put into effect through district elections did not seek to impose it on other parts of Carroll County. Instead, they largely abstained in the referenda, as did fence-law supporters in the same districts. Neither group acted as if motivated by a desire to thrust its value system on people in other areas or to protect a threatened communitarianism against hostile forces. Rather, they seem to have been responsive to their own rather narrowly drawn self-interest.
Finally, as the earlier analysis of votes also showed, and as the hypotheses of every historian who has examined the question predicted, townsmen strongly supported the stock law and opposed the fence law. Whether they did so to foist market relatiOns on yeomen or to keep hogs and cattle from running loose in the towns is a matter of interpretation, but, as the above analysis of the srkinfrc variable suggests, the latter is the preferable interpretation.
The fence-law struggle in Carroll and Jackson Counties, the centerpiece of one of the most striking and influential recent interpretations of postbellwn southern society, Steven Hahn's Roots of Southern Populism, does not represent, as he contends it does, an epic struggle between the aggressive agents of capitalism and the increasingly hapless defenders of a traditional cornmunitarian ideology or "moral economy." The astonishingly sophisticated debate on the subject, which anticipated many of the notions of modem economists, primarily concerned practical issues-costs, profits, conservation, and demographic change. 149 Those who appealed rhetorically to for each dis1ric1 is substituted for doc Gini cocfficienl. th<: results ar<: almost <:xaclly th<: sam<:. Tht corrdation b<:tw<:<:n the two m<:asurcs of inequality for this set of data is •0.91.
'"Hahn. RootJ ofSoulhtrn Populism, 253.11 turns out that in these counties,th<: districts containing villages had more equitably distributed la11tlholdings than did those in th<: most rural areas. This •ugg<:sts that the notion of an u11differentiated yeomanry in the outlyi11g areas should be: reexamined. 149 \\'c saw no evidence that newspaper editors, who were always anxious to reature controversy in order to build circulation, ccnsor<:d the fe11ce-law side of the debate. Indeed. the editor of the jefferson FortJI NnvJ, T. S.lloward. declared (ibid., S~ptembcr 19, 1879) that "we cannot tell whether this measure: (the stock lawJ would be b<:ndicial or not, e•pecially at this time. And, as we arc in no condition to form a correct opinion upon th~ sut~ect. we refrain from giving any, but offer our columns for a fair discussion of the 'Illest ion. and would like: to sec it ventilated. for we think no harm con be done in a [air and honest discussion of the benefits or evils that will arise from this measure. We shall stand ao impartial judge• in the maHer. and promise that both sidt• shall have a rair showing. We want our correspondents, lo start off witll, to give us tlu: opinions of their rc•pcctivc communities upon the sul1cct." In fact, the debate on both sides was rcmarhhly run and th<: number or articles on the subject was quite large. In any case,local "ttaditional rights," as well as those who apostrophised "progress," often mixed these invocations with practical, calculating argwnents in their letters to newspapers. The persuasive tactics of both sides reflected the late nineteenth-century upcountry society's consensus on private property and individualism. Each side devoted many words to what tenants and laborers should have expected to gain or lose from the change because in a competitive Jabot market, it was doubtful that this question of tort liability made much difference to the landless in the long nm.
1lle results of both simple and more complicated statistical analyses support our interpretation of the debates and undermine Hahn's culturalconflict theory. Stock-law proponents did take advantage of the 1881 legislature's district-option law to win gradually at the militia-district level what they could not pass in countywide referenda in either Carroll or Jackson Counties. Voters in districts where the objective economic benefits of the stock law were high were quite likely to adopt the new institutional arrangement .sooner than those where the benefits were lower or negative. Areas where landholding was most equitably distributed, the supposed bastions of yeoman independence, actually were more likely to support the stock law than were less egalitarian districts, all other things being equal. Townspeople, as Bonner, Flynn, and Hahn all agree, favored fencing in animals, not crops, but their reasons were, we have argued, more practical than ideological. If these two counties were representative of the upland South in the late nineteenth newspaper storie• conotitute the best extant source for the ·policy debate, and all historians who have studied the iuue have been rorced to rdy on them.
110 1nJacltlon County, six of the thirteen distrlcu adoJ>ted the otock law berore 1890, but instead or holding a countywide referendum, advocates convinced the legislature to impoae the otock law on the county in a special act, which was later declared unconstilu· tional . Gtorgio AciJ . .. 1889 265 , th•t the districts that imposed the otock law on themselves in Jackson County consisted of the towno of JciTerson and llarmony Cro••e "along with three of the wealthier districts" is misleading. (In fact, there were rour other districts that adopted the stock law in district referenda, along withjdrenon and llarmony CrO\·e-llarrisburg, Clarkeshoro, Newtown, and lloschton.) Sec JeffersonjacAJon lltrald, October 23, 1885, ami September 2 and November I I, 1887. Using total wealth per capita (the same indexlhatllahn uses) fr om the 1887 lax digest as a measure o£ wealth and excluding the two weohhy town distrir. u , the other rour districts that adopted the stock J.w in dist rict referenda ranked I, 3, 5, and 7, while the districts that did not ado pt the stock law before 1890 ranked 2, 4, 6, and 8-1 I. The correlation is hardly overwhelming.
says that the "nineteenth-century producer ideology," which he alleges that fence-law proponents shared, "challenged the hegemony of the market place" (Roots, 252): He now claims to oppose treating "the market" as an abstraction (p. 245), but in his book, he asserts that the Jacksonian hardmoney advocates "spoke for petty producers who feared the market's encroachments," while the Populist inflationists "spoke for petty producers who lived under the market's hegemony" (Roots, 192) . He now claims to have "studied this conflict in most of the twenty-six counties in the region, not in only two of them" (p. 250), but in his book he states that "two Upcountry counties have been selected for very close scrutiny: Jackson County in the east and Carrt>ll County in the west" (Roots, 9), thirty of his thirty-four tables treat only those two counties, and he never discusses election retwns or debates in the stock-law elections in detail for any other counties.
Halm now claims that he did not divide pro-and anti-fence-law supporters into two groups, but even in his reply he does. He asserts that it is "fairly obvious from no mote thaq a superficial examination" that the two sides consisted of "a coalition of landlords, planters, merchants, and other commercial interests" against "yeomen fanners, tenants; and laborers of both races" (p. 246), and he alleges (incorrectly, we think) that "election returns render strong evidence for the 'two-class model' "(p. 249).
3 He now claims not to "have a 'cultural imperialist' thesis" (p. 254}, but his reply portrays merchants, landlords, and townspeople as believers "in the moral and economic superiority of commercial society [who] sought to hasten its advance" (p. 253), and in his book he wrote that, unlike stock-law advocates, their opponents "never developed an organizational apparahis .... their resistance slowly collapsed when confronted by the superior resources of their foes" (Roots, 267).
Perhaps most significantly, Hahn asserts that we have misrepresented the struggle over tort liability by divorcing it from its larger context in the "political economy of emancipation" (p. 249t and the "social, economic, and political transformation of the Georgia upcountry" (p. 253), and he reiterates the grandiose assertions about the nature and importance of the fence-law contest that he made in his book. Yet Hahn pointedly ignores our detailed argument that the debaters of the 1880s rarely if ever concerned themselves with such larger issues. They were practical people who discussed the costs aM availability of labor, timber, and land and the benefits to the 'The: 5111011 qualiflcalions lhatllahn Jlllkcs forson1e blacks and tenants and his claim dat !niJ'IIfamily n:laliOJ~<Jtips might have played a role In d1e politics of dJ<: feuce debate no1 o•~Y support our more comt•lex picture of d1e aliJ!IUlltllls but also suggest dte Jtee:essily of a multivariate approach to sort dtc different influences. Quotallons In this r:s.<>~y from Steven llalm's Roou of Sourhtrn Populism an: indicated by Inserting RoofS followed by a page nwnbtr in pan:udlt.SCS following lhc: quotation.
• Hahn largely ignores our detailed reading of the contemporary stock-law debate, which suggests that he realizes, at least unconsciously, that the upcounbytnen's discussion actually does not support his case. Instead, he spends most of the substantive part of "Conunon Cents" discussing statistics-a remarkable emphasis for someone who obviously understands qualitative evidence much better than he does quantitative data and methods. To proclaim regression analysis an "ideological construct" (p. 244), as Hahn does, is to invite ridicule. Regression is, in fact, merely a statistical procedure, which has developed over two centuries in astronomy, genetics, and other disciplines and is widely used in the biological, natural, and social sciences and in engineering.
6 Although based on certain asswnptions, as is every statistical method (even casual ones like Hahn's), none of these assumptions guarantees that a coefficient will have any particular sign or take on any particular value. Nothing about the technique predetennined that the signs and significance levels of the variables in our Table 6 would falsify Halm 's cultural interpretation. While our data may be imperfect, our models misspecified, or our operationalization of variables faulty, no one who rejects quantitative methods out of hand, as Hahn does, can usefully criticize particular statistical models or cany the debate further. By choosing to remain ignorant about statistics, Hahn has not only closed himself off from any insights that might be available in much of the scholarship of social scientific history, political science, economics, and sociology, but he has also effectively conceded crucial portions of a debate about his own work.
Some possible larger implications of Halm's anti-quantitative remarks, which are not spelled out explicitly, are also misleading. If Halm's vague conunents are meant to suggest that statistical analysis in general or regression in particular necessarily leads to politically tinged conclusions or that theories based on individual action automatically do, then he is demonstrably wrong. For instance, on the basis of a largely statistical study, the economic historian Robert C. Allen concludes that the enclosure movement in England was not only unjust but that it was also inefficient. Yeomen, Allen's regressions show, practiced more capital-intensive farming than the gentry did. 7 Using both individualistic and group models, the Marxist economist Michael Reich rejects neoclassical theories of racial discrimination in labor markets, and he employs regression and other statistical procedures extensively in arguing that racism hurts, rather than helps, white workers. 1 And another Marxist economist, Jolm Roemer, shows that rigorous mathematical models can clarify and iUuminate many of the rather vague concepts of Marxian economics. Not only can most of Marxian economics be modeled on an individualistic level, Roemer contends, but such an approach can also protect it from what he terms the "conunon error in Marxian discussions"-functionalism.9 As these and many other examples show, mathematics and statistics are tools available to scholars of leftist political persuasions, a fact of which Halm, who does pot---or perhaps cannot-read such works, is apparently unaware. . forth. An article explaining ecological regression in detail, prominently refened to in that book, was published twenty years ago and is part of a large and continuing literature. 10 We used exactly the same technique to estimate the voting patterns (including nonvoting) of tenants and laborers and the consistency from referendum to referendum of fence-law and stock-law supporters. Hahn, however, declares that there "is in fact no way" that we could have discovered "how tenants and laborers-or how any other individuals or social groups-voted" (nll) because only aggregate data is available. He seemingly fails to realize that when he infers how groups voted by comparing votes by districts with averages of per capita wealth or percentages of landholders or whatever, he is making precisely the same sort of inference, only much less systematically. To be sure, there are interesting technical problems with ecological regression, but Hahn cannot consider them because he knows too little about statistics. In fact, he doesn't even recognize ecological regression when he sees it. Hahn's confusion about statistics also explains his misleading inference that men in Jackson and Carroll Counties must have "acted against their economic interests" (p. 256) because support for the stock law there was weak. For one thing, in the average district in these counti~, by our measure, only 34.5 percent of the farms could be expected to gain immediately by the passage of the stock law. For another, that measure, which we call savinsl 111 Table 6 , was not the only variable in our equation, not the only influence on voting that we found. Unlike the informal comparison of averages of two variables at a time that Hahn employs (t.g., Roots, 257-58), multiple regression allows the simultaneous consideration of the separate, independent effects of several variables on a dependent variable, such as voting for the stock law. That is why it is called multiple regression.
Another easily comprehended property of ~tistical techniques answ~rs another of Hahn's criticisms. Formal procedures such as regression explicitly include "enor" terms, which signify ~t estimates of relationshiJlS between variables are seldom perfect-especially when the variables measure human behavior. But so long a5 the c:t..racteristics that we are unable to measure, such as kinship ties in a particular place, do not vary systematically with other variables, the statistical estimates of the relationships between the variables that we can measure will be Wl8ffected.
11 Even though the most elementary statistics book or course explainc; such concepts, Hahn seems unacquainted with them. Hahn treats our alleged commibnent to perfect marets and a neoclassical economic model in which individuals always maximize material benefits as ideological sins that biased our results. The allegation is baseless. In fact, as we pointed out in "Common Sense," the fence conflict arose precisely because markets failed: there were too many economically involved individuals-with strong incentives to misrepresent their preferences-for a non-governmental solution to work. Indeed, much of modem economics attempts to explain why markets fail and what to do about it. Furthermore, in "Common Sense," we did not merely posit that people acted in accord with their self-interest; we explicitly tested the proposition in the particular case. If the sign of the coefficients for S4vings in Table 6 had been different, we would have concluded that something else motivated the voters, just as, ih another paper, Kousser concluded that lack of support in regression equations for a self-interest explanation implied that people acted out of ideology. 12 In sum, although we do think that in certain circumstances, markets work pretty efficiently, we by no means assume that uncritically or uniformly.'' We try our best to let evidence, not political stance, determine our conclusions. ' Hahn's unusually intemperate personal remarks deserve the gentlest answer that we can manage, short of silence. Because the ideas, research, computation, and writing that went into "Common Sense" were so shared that one person's contribution cannot be disentangled from the other's, the authors' names were listed alphabetically. Hahn's cheap" f "gibe unjustly belittles a diligent and original young scholar on the basis of egregiously speculative falsehoods. 14 Hahn could not possibly know whether his egotistical fantasy that Kantor was "put to work" (p. 243) to refute him is true, and, in fact, it is not. Kantor was planning to write a dissertation with a wellknown economic historian, Lance Davis, when he took a reading course in political history with Kousser and discovered that fence laws posed a particularly interesting example of a developing topic, the study of property Historians must c:hoole between these two visions~ theSe two wa)'s of doing history. Our way is grounded in the lraditional hisklrian's faith that many facets of the past are bowable.lt enjoim diligmt, careful scholars 1o. use aU appropriate tools, including lheories and methods developed in the other social sciences. It encourages clarity, enlw!ces rigor, and invites revision. Hahn's way, doctrinaire politics dressed up in the fashionable skepticism of the moment, dismisses other social sciences out of hand, wilhout UJUIDalL It disdaim clarity, denounces rigor, and defies revision. Rather than fostering understanding and propss, it finally degenerates into epistemological nihilism.
